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Perez: A Call for a Renewed Look at Chevron,
Jurisdictional Questions, and Statutory Silence
ABSTRACT
In City of Arlington v. FCC, the Supreme Court ended the debate over
whether an agency's interpretation of the scope of its jurisdiction should
receive Chevron deference, answering in the affirmative. This Comment,
however, argues that the Supreme Court should revisit this issue and
establish a no-deference rule for jurisdictional cases in which the agency's
assertion ofpower comes from statutory silence.
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Oregon Restaurant & Lodging
Ass'n v. Perez serves as the vehicle for illustrating the necessity of this
Comment's proposed no-deference rule. This Comment examines how the
Perez decision fits within this narrow issue ofjurisdictional questions and
merits establishment of this Comment's rule. In support of this proposal,
this Comment draws on Chevron's presumption of congressional intent.
This no-deference rule also serves as a valuable safeguard against agency
aggrandizement.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider a statute that reads "no dogs allowed in federal parks."
Clearly, this statute authorizes the National Parks Service to enforce the
terms of this statute by banning all dogs, but what about all other types of
animals? Does the fact that the statute is "silent" about other animals, in the
sense that only dogs are listed, give the Parks Service the authority to ban
those animals not specifically listed in the statute? Unless some other
provision grants the Parks Service the power to expand the scope of the
statute, this statute alone cannot serve as a source of authority to ban certain
things it does not cover. The reason is simple but fundamental: "Agencies
exercise whatever powers they possess because-and only because-such
powers have been delegated to them by Congress."' This illustration
exemplifies the fundamental error of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Oregon
Restaurant & Lodging Ass 'n v. Perez (Perez 1l), 2 which upheld the
Department of Labor's (DOL's) interpretation of § 203(m) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).3
1. Or. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. Perez (Perez III), 843 F.3d 355, 356 (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting), denying reh'g of816 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2016).
2. Or. Rest. & Lodging Ass'n v. Perez (Perez I1), 816 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2016). Note,
this Comment uses the terms Perez, Perez II, and Perez III to refer to the various cases that
make up this controversy. There were two district court decisions that addressed the validity
of the DOL's regulation regarding § 203(m). See Or. Rest. & Lodging v. Solis (Perez), 948
F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Or. 2013); Cesarz v. Wynn Las Vegas, L.L.C., No. 2:13-cv-00109-RCJ-
CWH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3094, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2014). Because Cesarz was
decided after Solis, the Solis opinion offers the more robust analysis. This Comment refers to
the Solis decision as Perez because it was the primary precursor to the appellate decisions
under that name. The Ninth Circuit consolidated Perez and Cesarz after hearing arguments
on both cases together. Perez II, 816 F.3d at 1083. Perez II denotes the Ninth Circuit's
decision reversing Perez and Cesarz. Perez III designates the ten-judge dissenting opinion
accompanying the denial of rehearing en banc of Perez I.
3. Perez 11, 816 F.3d at 1090; see also Updating Regulations Issued Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,832, 18,841 (Apr. 5, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts.
516, 531, 553, 778-80, 785-86, 790) (amending, inter alia, wage regulations found in 29
C.F.R. § 531.52, 531.55, 531.59) [hereinafter Updating Regulations].
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Section 203(m) limits how an employer may use an employee's tips
when taking a tip credit.4 Under the FLSA, an employer can pay its tip-
earning employees less than minimum wage and use the employees' tips to
make up the difference.5 When an employer uses this payment scheme,
§ 203(m) proscribes the employer from requiring the tip-earning employees
to share their tips with other employees who do not ordinarily receive tips.
6
The Perez II court addressed the validity of a DOL regulation that
expanded the scope of § 203(m) in a similar manner to the Parks Department
hypothetical above. Where the restriction contained in § 203(m) only
applies to one group of employers, the DOL's challenged regulation
expanded the scope of this section's restriction to all employers. 8 The Perez
// court upheld the DOL's interpretation of the statute under an
administrative law doctrine which dictates that reviewing courts give
deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers. 9 This
doctrine, called Chevron deference, gives controlling weight to an agency's
interpretation when the statute is ambiguous or silent and the interpretation
is reasonable.' 0 The Perez II court reasoned that § 203(m)'s silence, in that
its restriction only applied to one group of employers, afforded the DOL's
new rule deference under Chevron." This new rule meant § 203(m)'s
restriction applied to all employers. 12 To frame it differently, the Ninth
Circuit applied Chevron deference to the DOL's interpretation regarding its
"jurisdiction," or the scope of its power under the FLSA.
Until recently, courts and commentators disagreed over whether courts
must defer (apply Chevron) to an agency's own interpretation of a statutory
ambiguity that concerns the scope of an agency's authority (that is, its
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2012); see also infra Section II.A.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); see also infra Section II.A.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); see also infra Section II.A.
7. PerezlI, 816 F.3d at 1082-83.
8. See id.; see also Updating Regulations, supra note 3.
9. See Perez I, 816 F.3dat 1090.
10. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); see also infra Section L.A for an in-depth discussion of this doctrine.
11. Perez I, 816 F.3d at 1090.
12. See e.g., Updating Regulations, supra note 3.
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jurisdiction). 3 In City ofArlington v. FCC,14 the Supreme Court purported
to resolve this debate by holding that Chevron deference is applicable to an
agency's interpretation of its jurisdiction.'" This Comment, however, argues
that the Supreme Court should modify this bright-line rule with another
bright-line rule: Chevron deference is not applicable to jurisdictional
questions in which the underlying assertion of power comes from this Perez
H type of "statutory silence." Such a rule is necessary for two reasons. First,
this rule would ensure that congressional intent is the benchmark for
Chevron analysis by requiring an agency to locate an affirmative statutory
grant of authority before deference is accorded. The fact that a statute is
silent, in the sense that it neither grants nor denies a specific power, suggests
a congressional intent not to speak about that power. Second, this rule would
prevent the biggest problem facing this type of jurisdictional question:
agency aggrandizement.16 As the Perez // decision illustrates, deference on
this type of jurisdictional question results in agencies asserting power ex
nihilo to regulate groups that Congress never intended to regulate.
Part I of this Comment details the cases that form the Chevron doctrine,
traces the debate over jurisdictional questions, and considers how courts
have treated cases where the claim of jurisdiction comes from a statutory
silence. Part II discusses the pre-Perez regulatory and statutory background,
the lower court decision of Perez, the Ninth Circuit's analysis in the Perez /
decision, and the need for the Supreme Court to revisit the question of agency
jurisdiction. Part III offers a no-deference rule for jurisdictional questions
13. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1497, 1522-27
(2009). This article provides an overview of this debate and notes that the Supreme Court has
not resolved this issue indefinitely. See id. at 1500 n.15 (citing Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406,408 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court cannot be said to have resolved the issue
definitively.")); see also Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron
Doctrine: Congressional Intent, Judicial Judgment, andAdministrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN.
L. REv. 783, 812 n.151 (2007) ("The question of whether Chevron deference applies to the
resolution of 'jurisdictional' issues has proved troublesome to courts."); Thomas W. Merrill
& Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 844 (2001) ("The Court has
never resolved whether there should be a 'scope of jurisdiction' exception to Chevron
deference ...."); but see, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354,
381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 3.5, at 157 (4th ed. 2002) (stating that the "pattern" of the Court's decisions suggests
"Chevron applies to cases in which an agency adopts a construction of a jurisdictional
provision of a statute it administers.").
14. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
15. Id. at 1864.
16. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1503 (describing aggrandizement as "the risk
that the agency will exercise a power Congress did not intend for it to have, or that it will
extend its power more broadly than Congress envisioned").
[Vol. 40:1
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arising out of statutory silences. Part III also discusses how this rule finds
support in Chevron's background presumption of congressional intent and
prevents agencies from exceeding the scope of their authority.
I. BACKGROUND-CHEVRON, JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS, AND
STATUTORY SILENCE
Because the Ninth Circuit relied on Chevron in its decision upholding
the DOL's interpretation of§ 203(m), this Part begins by providing a general
overview of the Chevron doctrine and how this doctrine is rooted in
congressional intent. Next, this Part defines the various types of
jurisdictional cases. Lastly, this Part focuses on cases where jurisdiction
arises from a statutory silence and provides an overview of how courts have
historically treated these types of cases.
A. Chevron and Its Progeny
When the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' the Court unknowingly created the most
important decision concerning how courts should treat an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers.' 8 This Court provided the following
two-part test for determining the validity of an agency's interpretation of a
statute:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 19
A presumption of congressional intent is the foundation of this canonical
framework: namely, "that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute
administered by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved,
17. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
18. See Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1867,
1872 (2015) (Chevron is the "Supreme Court's most important decision regarding judicial
deference to agency views of statutory meaning.").
19. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows., 20
In Chevron step one, reviewing courts "employ[] traditional tools of
statutory construction" in order to ascertain congressional intent.2' Thus,
Chevron dictates that the judiciary has the "final authority on issues of
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are
contrary to clear congressional intent., 22 If the reviewing court decides
Congress's intent is clear, Chevron deference is inapplicable, and the plain
meaning of the statute must prevail.2 3 Chevron step two applies only if "the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue. '24 If step
two is applicable, the court determines whether the agency's action is "based
on a permissible construction of the statute. 25 At step two, the reviewing
court gives significant deference to the agency's construction, entitling the
agency's construction "controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. 26
Although Chevron only lays out a two-question framework, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp.27 added an additional step to
the formulation-step zero. 28 This preliminary step zero determines whether
an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to Chevron deference at
all.29 In order for it to apply, a reviewing court must determine that "it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
20. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Chevron
thus provides a stable background rule against which Congress can legislate: Statutory
ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts
but by the administering agency." Id. (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,
397 (1999)).
21. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. "If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 842-43.
24. Id. at 843.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 844.
27. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
28. See id. at 226-27. Although the Supreme Court has never invoked the term "step
zero," courts and commentators refer to the rule established in Mead as Chevron step zero.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 191 (2006) (defining
"Chevron Step Zero"); see also Perez II, 816 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) ("At
Chevron step zero, we ask whether the Chevron framework applies at all.").
29. See Perez II, 816 F.3d at 1086 n.3.
[Vol. 40:1
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deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."30 The Mead
Court confirmed that "congressional intent is the touchstone for [Chevron]
analysis" and that Chevron deference is not applicable if there is no
congressional "intention to delegate interpretive authority.",
3 1
B. Defining Jurisdictional Questions
The Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference is applicable to an
agency's interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of
the agency's own authority.32 Writing for the majority in City ofArlington,
Justice Antonin Scalia dispelled the notion that a distinct category of
jurisdictional questions even existed and admonished that "judges should not
waste their time in the mental acrobatics needed to decide whether an
agency's interpretation of a statutory provision is 'jurisdictional' or
'nonjurisdictional.' ' 33 For Justice Scalia, the question is "always, simply,
whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's argument, several commentators have
identified jurisdictional questions.3 5  Jurisdictional questions address
"whether an agency's views on the extent of its own powers should merit
30. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27 (noting various ways this may be shown: "By an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some
other indication of a comparable congressional intent").
31. Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1525-26 ("[T]he Supreme Court has been fairly
consistent ... in maintaining that congressional delegation is the basis for according
[Chevron] deference .... ).
32. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013) ("[W]here Congress
has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly
allow.... [I]n rigorously applying [this] rule, a court need not pause to puzzle over whether
the interpretive question presented is 'jurisdictional.' If 'the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute,' that is the end of the matter." (quoting Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984))).
33. Id. at 1870. This "argument against deference rests on the premise that there exist
two distinct classes of agency interpretations: Some interpretations ... define the agency's
'jurisdiction.' Others ... are simply applications of jurisdiction the agency plainly has." Id.
at 1868. According to Justice Scalia, that premise is "false, because the distinction ... is a
mirage." Id. But see id. at 1879-80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "jurisdiction"
concerns "whether Congress has granted the agency interpretive authority over the statutory
ambiguity at issue"); Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1555-64 (arguing a distinction does
exist and identifying various types of "jurisdictional questions").
34. City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
35. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13. Although these authors defined jurisdictional
questions prior to City of Arlington, their definitions help illustrate the jurisdictional debate
and provide a framework within which this Comment's proposed no-deference rule would
work. See infra Part III.
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Chevron deference,"36 and these questions can be broken down into
"analytically distinct categories."3  Although some of the definitions
overlap, Sales and Adler38 describe at least five types ofjurisdictional cases:
(1) "agency assertions of jurisdiction," (2) "disclaimers of jurisdiction," (3)
"existence of agency jurisdiction," (4) "scope of jurisdiction," and (5)
''presence (or lack) of a factual predicate necessary to trigger agency
jurisdiction."39
This first category, "jurisdiction-asserting cases," involves the most
common jurisdictional issue: "That is, the agency interprets a statute as
evincing Congress's design to confer on it a particular power. '40 These types
of cases present the classic danger a no-deference rule seeks to prevent-
agency aggrandizement. 41 Conversely, the second category, "jurisdiction-
disclaiming cases," deals with an agency relinquishing a power Congress
arguably bestowed upon the agency.42 For instance, the Environmental
Protection Agency determined it lacked authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act because it claimed greenhouse gases were not
"air pollutants" under the Act.43 According to Sales and Adler, this type of
jurisdictional case involves the opposite danger of jurisdiction-asserting
cases-the risk of abrogation.44
The third jurisdictional category, "existence-of-power cases," arises
when an agency asserts "a novel power unrelated to the authority with which
Congress has entrusted it."'45 For example, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) claimed the power to adjudicate state counterclaims,
even though the Commodity Exchange Act only granted the CFTC authority
36. Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1502.
37. Id.
38. These two Chevron scholars co-authored an influential article in 2009 that identified
various types of jurisdictional cases. Id.
39. Id. These authors proposed a no-deference rule for all jurisdiction cases except
factual predicate cases. Id. at 1501 ("[C]ourts should deny Chevron deference regardless of
whether an agency is asserting or disclaiming jurisdiction."). This Comment offers a more
modest proposal: deference is not warranted only in jurisdiction-asserting cases arising from
statutory silence like the silence in Perez II.
40. Id. at 1503 (citing Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based
Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 989, 992 (1999)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511-13 (2007).
44. Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1504 (describing abrogation as "the possibility that
an agency might fail to discharge the duty with which Congress has charged it").
45. Id. at 1504-05 (In essence, "the agency creates a power for itself ex nihilo (or
categorically disclaims any power whatsoever).").
[Vol. 40:1
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to review federal commodities law.46 Similar to the third category, "scope-
of-power cases" occur when "Congress has delegated an agency a certain
quantity of authority but [Congress] has left its magnitude and reach
somewhat unclear.",4 7 Because of their similarities, these two groups of
jurisdictional cases overlap each other frequently, causing identification
issues. 48 Lastly, the "factual-predicate case" pertains to "whether a given set
of facts necessary for the exercise of [an agency] power exists."
49
As Sales and Adler demonstrate, jurisdictional questions can be
identified and divided into classes apart from non-jurisdictional questions,
contrary to Justice Scalia's charge in City of Arlington. After City of
Arlington, courts must apply Chevron deference to all of these types of
jurisdictional questions.50 This Comment, however, argues that the Supreme
Court should create a no-deference rule for a narrow subset of jurisdiction-
asserting cases, where the assertion of authority comes from the statute's
silence on the proposed power.5 '
C. Cases Where Jurisdiction Arises from a Statutory Silence
Chevron deference applies when an agency is delegated rule-making
authority and when a statute is ambiguous or silent.5 2 Sometimes an agency
asserts that a statute's silence (in the sense that the statute does not explicitly
deny the asserted power) is evidence that Congress delegated to the agency
the power to regulate the very practice on which the statute is silent.53 For
example, the National Mediation Board (NMB) asserted authority to
investigate sua sponte representation disputes between railroad employees,
46. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837-45 (1986).
47. Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1505 (noting that this category deals with an "agency
interpret[ing] its grant of jurisdiction to entail another power, or to permit it to exercise its
power in a particular way").
48. Id. ("[I]t can be particularly challenging to draw the line between expanding the scope
of an existing power and asserting an entirely new power.").
49. Id. "In these cases, Congress has identified the general conditions under which the
agency can exercise its regulatory authority, but has delegated the agency responsibility for
determining when the relevant conditions are met." Id. at 1505-06.
50. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
51. Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1506; see also infra Section I.C.
52. See supra Section L.A (explaining when Chevron deference is appropriate).
53. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1506 (Sales and Adler describe this type of case
as a "subset of jurisdiction-asserting cases," in which (agencies claim) "the fact that a statute
is silent on the conferral of a proposed power-i.e., the fact that the statute neither grants nor
denies it-[is] evidence that Congress anticipated that the agency would exercise that
power.").
9
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mainly because of the Railway Labor Act's failure to expressly prohibit this
power.54
In Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n v. National Mediation Board, the
D.C. Circuit declined to apply Chevron deference to the NMB's
interpretation of the Railway Labor Act.55 Instead, the D.C. Circuit reviewed
the statute de novo and employed traditional tools of statutory construction
to invalidate the agency's interpretation of the statute.56 The D.C. Circuit
proceeded to emphatically reject the NMB's theory of agency power,5
stating:
To suggest, as the [NMB] effectively does, that Chevron step two is
implicated any time a statute does not expressly negate the existence of a
claimed administrative power (i.e. [,] when the statute is not written in 'thou
shalt not' terms), is both flatly unfaithful to ... principles of administrative
law... and refuted by precedent. Were courts to presume a delegation of
power absent an express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy
virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron
and quite likely with the Constitution as well.5 8
This passage illustrates the fundamental principle underlying the court's
decision and Chevron deference in general: "An agency's power is no greater
than that delegated to it by Congress., 59 Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that the Railway Labor Act left "no gap for the agency to fill" because
"Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."
60
The problem with the NMB's assertion of agency power is that the
agency's interpretation conflated two types of statutory silence. In Perez III,
54. See Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 658 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc) (explaining that the Railway Labor Act grants the NMB authority to
investigate representation disputes "upon the request of either party to the dispute," but the
Act is silent about whether the NMB could investigate sua sponte (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1988)).
55. Id. at 671 ("[T]his [is not] a case in which principles of deference to an agency's
interpretation come into play. Such deference is warranted only when Congress has left a gap
for the agency to fill pursuant to an express or implied 'delegation of authority to the agency.'"
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984))).
56. Id. at 664-69 ("We need look no further than the language of [the section of the
statute at issue], the structure of the Act, and its legislative history to determine that these
proposed procedures are not only unprecedented, but legally insupportable as well.").
57. Essentially, the NMB's position "amount[ed] to the bare suggestion that it
possess[ed] plenary authority to act within a given area simply because Congress [had]
endowed it with some authority to act in that area." Id. at 670.
58. Id. at 671 (citations omitted).
59. See id. at 670 (quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986)).
60. Id. at 671 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
[Vol. 40:1
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Judge O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit concisely described the two differing
types of statutory silence:
Sometimes "[statutory] silence is meant to convey nothing more than a
refusal to tie the agency's hands," meaning that Congress has given the
agency discretion to choose between policy options Congress itself has
placed on the table. But "sometimes statutory silence, when viewed in
context, is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion." In other words,
not all statutory silences are created equal.6'
Thus, a statute's silence does not always mean Congress delegated
legislative authority to the agency to expand its scope, but rather the silence
is better understood as a limit on an agency's regulatory authority.
Numerous other circuits have addressed this issue; all agree that
"silence does not always constitute a gap an agency may fill, but often
reflects Congress's decision not to regulate in a particular area at all, a
decision that is binding on the agency., 62 Most importantly, the Supreme
Court agrees with these lower circuit decisions, stating that "[w]here
Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it."
63
Therefore, it appears that a statute's noninterference with an activity is a
"clear line," indicating Congress's intention that the activity is off-limits
from agency action. This Comment's no-deference rule ensures that the
61. Perez III, 843 F.3d 355, 360 (9th Cir. 2016) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222-23 (2009)). For a
discussion on the difference between the two types of statutory silence, see infra notes 205-
17 and accompanying text.
62. See Perez III, 843 F.3d at 362 (O'Scanlain, J., dissenting); see also Aid Ass'n for
Lutherans v. U.S. Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[T]he Postal
Service's position seems to be that the disputed regulations are permissible because the statute
does not expressly foreclose the construction advanced by the agency. We reject this position
as entirely untenable under well-established case law."); Coffelt v. Fawkes, 765 F.3d 197, 202
(3d Cir. 2014) ("Even where a statute is 'silent' on the question at issue, such silence 'does
not confer gap-filling power on an agency unless the question is in fact a gap-an ambiguity
tied up with the provisions of the statute.' (quoting Lin-Zheng v. Attorney Gen., 557 F.3d
147, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc))); Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 160 (4th
Cir. 2013) ("Because we do not presume a delegation of power simply from the absence of
an express withholding of power, we do not find that Chevron's second step is implicated
,any time a statute does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative
power."' (quoting Am. Bar Ass'n v. F.T.C., 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005))); Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 186 (5th Cir. 2015) (as revised) ("The dissent repeatedly claims
that congressional silence has conferred on DHS the power to act. To the contrary, any such
inaction cannot create such power." (citation omitted)); Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853,
861 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Courts 'will not presume a delegation of power based solely on the fact
that there is not an express withholding of such power."' (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995))).
63. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
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courts, not agencies, decide whether Congress set down a "clear line,"
thereby preventing the risk of agency aggrandizement.
II. PEREZ II: A CASE FOR No DEFERENCE
Chevron and City of Arlington dictate deference to agency
interpretations on the scope of an agency's jurisdiction under a statute;
however, as Section I.C illustrated, cases where jurisdiction arises from a
statutory silence should arguably not receive deference.64 Nevertheless, the
Perez II decision applied City of Arlington's command by upholding the
DOL's interpretation of § 203(m) of the FLSA. 65 This case illustrates why
jurisdictional questions arising from statutory silences should not warrant
Chevron deference because it exemplifies the problem of agency
aggrandizement.66 Part II begins with an overview of the statutory and
regulatory landscape that created this controversy. Next, this Part discusses
the lower court decision of Perez. Lastly, this Part provides an overview of
the majority's analysis in Perez II, demonstrates how this decision fits into
the jurisdictional framework outlined in Part I, and shows why this decision
should be overturned.
A. Pre-Perez Statutory and Regulatory Landscape
Enacted in 1938, "the FLSA was designed to give specific minimum
protections to individual workers and to ensure that each employee covered
by the Act ... would be protected from the 'evil of overwork as well as
underpay. ' '' 67  This Act 68 established an hourly minimum wage that
employers must pay their employees.69 If the employee is a "tipped
employee," 70 employers can meet this wage requirement in two ways: (1)
paying their employees at or above the minimum requirement or (2) paying
employees below minimum "but only if such employees receive enough
64. Id. at 1874-75; see also supra Section I.C.
65. Perez I, 816 F.3d 1080,1090 (9th Cir. 2016).
66. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1503 (describing aggrandizement as "the risk
that the agency will exercise a power Congress did not intend for it to have, or that it will
extend its power more broadly than Congress envisioned").
67. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel,
316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942)).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
69. Id. § 206(a).
70. '"Tipped employee' means any employee engaged in an occupation in which he
customarily and regularly receives more than $30 a month in tips." Id. § 203(t).
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money in tips to make up the difference. '7 1 The service industry refers to
the second option as a "tip credit" because employers use the employee's
tips as a credit against their minimum wage requirement. 2 In addition,
employers in the service industry commonly require their employees to share
their tips with one another, a practice known as "tip pooling. '7  Under
§ 203(m) of the FLSA, an employer taking a tip credit cannot require an
employee to participate in a tip pool consisting of both employees who are
"customarily and regularly tipped" 74 and employees who are not. 7 5 For
example, a restaurant owner could not pay the waiting staff below minimum
wage (using a tip credit) while requiring them to share their tips with the
kitchen staff.
7 6
In Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that § 203(m)
does not prohibit tip pooling among all employees when no tip credit is
taken.7 8 The Cumbie court determined that the plain text of § 203(m) only
"imposes conditions on taking a tip credit and does not state freestanding
requirements pertaining to all tipped employees."' 7  Therefore, Cumbie
established that the "FLSA does not restrict tip pooling when no tip credit is
taken."'
Shortly after Cumbie, the DOL promulgated new regulations on this
issue, contradicting Cumbie.8' In addition, the DOL stated in the preamble
to these regulations that it "respectfully believes that [Cumbie] was
incorrectly decided.,8 2 Under the new regulations, employers who do not
take a tip credit cannot retain any of an employee's tips unless in furtherance
of a valid tip pool." According to the DOL, a valid tip pool "can only include
those employees who customarily and regularly receive tips., 8 4 Several
71. Perez II, 843 F.3d 355, 356 (9th Cir. 2016) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
72. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
74. A restaurant server is an employee who is "customarily and regularly tipped," while
the kitchen staff is not. Perez III, 843 F.3d at 356 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (quoting
id. § 203(m)).
75. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
76. See Perez III, 843 F.3d at 356 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
77. Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2010).
78. Id. at 580-83.
79. Id. at 581 ("A statute that provides that a person must do X in order to achieve Y
does not mandate that a person must do X, period.").
80. Id. at 582.
81. See Updating Regulations, supra note 3.
82. Id.
83. 29 C.F.R. § 531.52 (2011) ("Tips are the property of the employee whether or not the
employer has taken a tip credit under section 3(m) of the FLSA.").
84. Id. § 531.54.
13
Fritts: Perez: A Call for a Renewed Look at Chevron, Jurisdictional Quest
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2018
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
months later, the DOL issued a Field Assistance Bulletin, which described
the 2011 regulations as gap fillers for the "silence" left in § 203(m)
pertaining to tip pooling and tip credits. 85 Returning to the previous example,
under the DOL's new regulations, a restaurant owner cannot make the
waitstaff share their tips with the kitchen staff, even though the owner pays
both above minimum wage.
8 6
B. The District Court Decision
The Perez decision addressed the apparent conflict between the DOL's
2011 regulations on the one hand and the Cumbie decision on the other.8 In
Perez, a restaurant association and an individual owner sued the DOL,
arguing that the 2011 regulation was invalid.88  All plaintiffs paid their
employees above the federal minimum wage and required their servers to
share tips with the kitchen staff.89 The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the
2011 regulation and continue their tip-pooling arrangement. 90 Siding with
the plaintiffs, the district court struck down the DOL's 2011 regulation as
invalid at Chevron step one9' and denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 92 As the basis for the ruling, the Perez court considered
several justifications for why the DOL's regulations did not warrant Chevron
deference.
First, Cumbie already established that the language of § 203(m) is
"clear" and "plain," only "impos[ing] conditions on taking a tip credit and
does not state freestanding requirements pertaining to all tipped
employees." 93  Relying on the standard from National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Services (Brand X), which
states that a "prior judicial construction of a statute trumps [a later] agency
construction, ' the district court concluded that Cumbie precluded the
85. See Memorandum from Nancy J. Leppink, Deputy Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Labor, to
Regional Administrators and District Directors (Feb. 29, 2012), https://perma.cc/PJL3-4KTT
("These regulations fill a gap in the statutory scheme left by the Act's silence on the use of
employees' tips when no tip credit is taken.").
86. See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 531.52.
87. See Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Or. 2013).
88. Id. at 1219.
89. Perez I, 816 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2016).
90. Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2dat 1218-19.
91. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (Step
one asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.").
92. Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
93. Id. at 1223 (quoting Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577,581 (9th Cir. 2010)).
94. "A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
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DOL's regulation applying § 203(m) to all employers. 95 The DOL, however,
argued that Cumbie only applies to employers who take a tip credit, that both
§ 203(m) and Cumbie are silent concerning those who do not take a tip credit,
and that Chevron deference is appropriate because of this silence. 96 The
district court rejected this argument, 97 noting that the "clear and
unambiguous text" of § 203(m) shows "Congress intended only to limit the
use of tips by employers when a tip credit is taken."98 Therefore, "[Cumbie]
leaves no room for agency discretion here.
'
"
99
Second, although Cumbie already clarified Congress's intentions
regarding the issue of whether § 203(m) applies to all employers, the Perez
court undertook the task of determining congressional intent through
traditional tools of statutory construction, per Chevron's instructions. 0 0
Looking at the text of § 203(m), the district court concluded that the text is
"clear and unambiguous"' 0'1 and that reading the text to apply to all
employers would "render its reference to the tip credit, as well as its
conditional language and structure, superfluous."'0 2
Third, the district court relied on the purpose and general structure of
the FLSA to illustrate that the DOL's interpretation does not warrant
Chevron deference. 03 The district court judge explained that the FLSA
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion." Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. (Brand X),
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). Both dissenting opinions in the Perez line of cases also argued that
BrandXdictates that Chevron not apply. See Perez II, 816 F.3d at 1093 (Smith, J., dissenting);
Perez II, 843 F.3d 355, 356-57 (9th Cir. 2016) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). This Comment
agrees with the dissenting opinions; however, this Comment focuses on why Perez 11 should
be overruled and a no-deference rule for statutory silences should be established. Therefore,
this Comment does not address the BrandXargument in detail.
95. Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
96. Id.
97. The plaintiffs in Cumbie made the same argument. See Cumbie, 596 F.3d at 580
(stating the DOL's argument in that action: "That under section 203(m), an employee must
be allowed to retain all of her tips-except in the case of a 'valid' tip pool involving only
customarily tipped employees-regardless of whether her employer claims a tip credit.").
98. Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 ("This is not silence. This is repudiation.").
99. Id.
100. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had
an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect.").
101. Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 ("[Section 203(m)] imposes conditions on employers
that take a tip credit but does not impose a freestanding requirement pertaining to all tipped
employees.").
102. Id. (quoting Cumbie, 596 F.3d at 581).
103. Id. at 1225.
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"protect[s] all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive
working hours,' ' 10 4 "includes specific statutory protections,"'' 5 and is "an Act
of defined scope.' ' 6  Based on these observations, the district court
concluded that Congress provided two choices for employers: "[E]ither pay
the full minimum wage free and clear of any conditions, or take a tip credit
and comply with the conditions imposed by [§ 203(m)].' 10 7 Both, the district
court declared, would fulfill the purposes of the FLSA and protect an
employee's right to minimum wage.'0 8 The DOL's new regulations,
however, do not "protect covered workers from substandard wages or
oppressive working hours, nor do they vindicate any of the FLSA's specific
statutory protections."'0 9 Therefore, the district court concluded that these
regulations do not comport with the purpose and general structure of the
FLSA."0
Lastly, the district court turned its attention back to the DOL's argument
regarding silence"'. in order to invalidate the regulations at Chevron step
one." 2 The district court judge articulated that the DOL's position fails to
appreciate the nuances of discerning congressional intent at step one.113 For
the district court, the question was "whether the absence of language
regarding an employer's use of tips when no tip credit is taken amounts to
an implicit gap left for the agency to fill or an area where Congress intended
free economic choice." ' 14 The judge lambasted the DOL's position that
"[c]ongressional silence regarding an area of economic activity is never a
104. Id. (quoting Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981));
see also supra Section I.A.
105. Perez, 948 F. Supp. at 1225. For example, § 6(a) sets a federal minimum wage, and
§ 203(m) defines the term "wage," allowing for certain tip credits. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a),
203(m) (2012); see also supra Section II.A.
106. Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1225; see also supra Section II.A.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. ("According to the DOL, [§ 203(m)] is silent regarding an employer's use of tips
when no tip credit is taken. That is, the FLSA does not authorize the unfettered use of tips
when no tip credit is taken, nor does it expressly prohibit the DOL from regulating tips under
such circumstances. Therefore, Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at
issue, and [the reviewing court] need only ask whether the DOL's construction is
reasonable.").
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1225-26 ("To express its intention that certain activities be left free from
regulation, Congress need not lace the United States Code with the phrase, 'You shall not
pass! .').
114. Id. at 1226.
[Vol. 40:1
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss1/8
2018] PEREZ: A CALL FOR A RENEWED LOOK AT CHEVRON 189
considered decision to let the economic actors make their own choices."
1 15
By employing traditional tools of statutory construction, the district court
found that the silence in § 203(m) clearly indicated Congress's desire to only
restrict those who take a tip credit. 116 Because the district court found that
the DOL's regulations were invalid under Chevron step one, the Perez court
granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, resulting in an appeal
to the Ninth Circuit.
C. Majority Chevron Analysis
Both Perez and Perez H agreed that the DOL's regulations satisfied
Chevron step zero; 17 however, the two courts diverged over whether Cumbie
foreclosed the agency from promulgating these new regulations under
Chevron step one. The district court held that the prior interpretation in
Cumbie barred the agency's new interpretation. 1 8 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit believed Cumbie did not foreclose the agency's regulation, based on
a "crucial distinction between statutory language that affirmatively protects
or prohibits a practice and statutory language that is silent about that
practice." ' 19 According to the Perez II majority, Cumbie did not hold that
the FLSA "unambiguously and categorically protects" employers (who do
not take a tip credit) who implement tip-pooling arrangements consisting of
those who customarily receive tips and those who do not.120  Rather,
"[Cumbie] held that 'nothing in the text purports to restrict' the practice in
question."' 12 1 Based on this distinction, the Perez H court reasoned that
§ 203(m) is silent on whether it applies to employers who do not take a tip
credit, leaving room for the DOL's 2011 rule.
122
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1223; see also Perez II, 816 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The DOL
exercised its rulemaking authority within its substantive field when it promulgated the 2011
rule.").
118. Perez II, 816 F.3d at 1086 (citing Perez, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1226; Cesarz v. Wynn
Las Vegas, L.L.C., No. 2:13-cv-00109-RCJ-CWH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3094, at *3, *6
(D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2014)).
119. Perez I, 816 F.3d at 1087.
120. Id. at 1086.
121. Id. (quoting Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 2010)). The
Perez II majority reaches this conclusion based on the different question at issue in Cumbie
and that before the court in Perez 11. Id For the majority, Cumbie dealt with whether a
restaurant's tip-pooling practice violated the FLSA, and the question before the Ninth Circuit
in Perez II was whether the DOL had the authority to regulate employers who do not take a
tip credit. Id.
122. Id. at 1088.
17
Fritts: Perez: A Call for a Renewed Look at Chevron, Jurisdictional Quest
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2018
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
In defending this position, the Ninth Circuit pointed to Christensen v.
Harris County123 and Justice Souter's single-sentence concurrence 124 for the
proposition that "the DOL, by regulation, could prohibit the very practice the
Court held to be neither explicitly nor implicitly prohibited by the FLSA.',
125
In Christensen, the Supreme Court upheld a "forced use"' 126 policy because
"no relevant statutory provision expressly or implicitly prohibits" the
policy. 127  The Perez H majority emphasized the Christensen Court's
rationale that Harris County's policy did not violate the FLSA because the
statute was silent about the practice. 128  Most importantly, the majority
latched on to Christensen's suggestions that "were the agency to enact future
regulations, Chevron deference would apply.' 129
Because Cumbie was a case "grounded in statutory silence," the
majority was bound by Christensen to give discretion to the DOL in Perez
H.3O Although the dissent argued Cumbie clearly established that § 203(m)
applies only to those who take a tip credit,' 3 ' the majority contended Cumbie
only established that this section does not constitute a "statutory
impediment" that would prevent those who do not take a tip credit from
implementing tip pooling. 3 2 Therefore, Chevron step one was satisfied
because "the FLSA is silent regarding the tip pooling practices of employers
who do not take a tip credit.',
133
After concluding step one was satisfied, the majority moved to step
two134 and determined that the "DOL's interpretation is more closely aligned
with [c]ongressional intent, and at the very least, that the DOL's
123. Christensen v. Harris Cry., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
124. Id. at 589 (Souter, J., concurring) ("I join the opinion of the Court on the assumption
that it does not foreclose a reading of the [FLSA] of 1938 that allows the Secretary of Labor
to issue regulations limiting forced use.").
125. Perez II, 816 F.3dat 1087.
126. Harris County implemented a policy "forcing" employees to use compensatory time
in order to avoid paying large sums of monetary overtime compensation. See Christensen,
529 U.S. at 580-81.
127. Id. at 588.
128. Perez II, 816 F.3dat 1087.
129. Id. (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586-87).
130. Perez II, 816 F.3dat 1088.
131. Id. at 1091-92 (Smith, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1088 (majority opinion) (quoting Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577,
583 (9th Cir. 2010)). "What was 'clear' in Cumbie was that the FLSA's tip credit provision
did not impose any 'statutory interference' that would invalidate tip pooling when no tip credit
is taken-i.e., that the FLSA was silent regarding this practice." Id. at 1088 n.4.
133. Id. at 1089.
134. See supra Section L.A (describing Chevron step two).
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interpretation is reasonable."' 3 5  In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit looked to several sources that support the DOL's interpretation of
§ 203(m), including legislative history suggesting that the "only acceptable
use by an employer of employee tips is a tip credit,"' 3 6 comments from the
DOL concerning the need for clarification in § 203(m), 3 and the overall
purpose of the FLSA.'38 Based on these sources, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the DOL's interpretation was reasonable and reversed both of the district
court judgments. 1'3 9
D. The Dissenting Opinions Correctly Concluded the 2011 Regulations
Were Invalid
A divided panel in Perez II upheld the DOL's 2011 regulations under
Chevron, with Judge N. Randy Smith dissenting. 40 The plaintiffs petitioned
for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. 14 1 Although the full court voted
on the matter, the petition failed to receive a majority of votes in favor of en
banc consideration; therefore, the panel denied both petitions.142 The denial
of rehearing en banc included a dissent written by Judge O'Scannlain that
nine other circuit judges joined. 143 This Section provides an overview of the
main reasons, according to the Perez II and Perez III dissents, why the
decision was wrong.
In his dissenting opinion in Perez II, Judge Smith began with the
following admonishment: "Colleagues, even if you don't like circuit
precedent, you must follow it. Afterwards, you call the case en banc. You
cannot create your own contrary precedent."' 44 According to Judge Smith,
the majority ignored Cumbie, which was binding precedent; therefore, his
135. Perez I, 816 F.3d at 1090.
136. Id.; S. REP. No. 95-440, at 368 (1977) ("Tips are not wages, and under the 1974
amendments tips must be retained by the employees.., and cannot be paid to the employer
or otherwise used by the employer to offset his wage obligation, except to the extent permitted
by section [20]3(m).").
137. Perez II, 816 F.3d at 1089 ("The DOL ... concluded that, as written, 203(m)
contained a 'loophole' that allowed employers to exploit the FLSA tipping provisions." (citing
Updating Regulations, supra note 3, at 18,842)).
138. Id. at 1090 ("[T]he FLSA is a broad and remedial act that Congress has frequently
expanded and extended.").
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1090-91 (Smith, J., dissenting).
141. See Perez III, 843 F.3d 355, 355-56 (9th Cir. 2016).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 356.
144. Perez II, 816 F.3d at 1091 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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opinion began by detailing the analysis in Cumbie. 145 Judge Smith continued
by illustrating how the facts of Perez were "identical" to those in Cumbie
and how "this case should have ended with a memorandum disposition.',
146
The difference this time, according to Judge Smith, was the DOL's 2011
rule, which "interpret[s] section 203(m) differently than [the Ninth Circuit]
interpreted it in Cumbie.' 14 7 Judge Smith concluded "this new rule changes
nothing" because a court need not defer to an agency interpretation when
"Congress's intent behind a statute is clear."'
' 4 8
After considering Brand X, 14 9 Judge Smith turned to the majority's
statutory silence' 0 argument and contended that Cumbie put this claim to
rest because "[n]owhere in its text, either explicitly or implicitly, does
section 203(m) impose a blanket tipping requirement on all employers."''
Christensen, Judge Smith argued, also has no validity here; 5 2 and if it were
relevant, the majority's interpretation would uproot the fundamental
underpinning of Chevron "that administrative rulemaking be rooted in a
congressional delegation of authority."' 53 The problem with the majority's
argument, according to Judge Smith, was that the "Supreme Court has made
clear that it is only in the ambiguous 'interstices' within the statute where
145. See id. at 1091-93 (noting Cumbie did not disturb Williams' presumption that
arrangements to redistribute tips are valid and that "the plain text of section203(m) ... only
imposed a condition on employers who take a tip credit, rather than a blanket requirement on
all employers regardless of whether they take a tip credit"); see also supra Section II.A.
146. Perez I, 816 F.3d at 1092. Judge Smith pointed out that the employers in both cases
did not take a tip credit and paid their employees above the federal minimum wage; that both
employers implement a tip-pooling practice consisting of all employees, including those not
customarily tipped; and that the tipped employees challenged this tip-pooling practice "under
the same theory advanced [and rejected] in Cumbie." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1092-93.
149. Judge Smith detailed how the DOL's interpretation should not have survived because
Cumbie's construction "trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron
deference." Id. at 1093 (quoting BrandX, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)).
150. See supra Section II.C.
151. Perez II, 816 F.3d at 1093 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("We explained, 'A statute that
provides that a person must do X in order to achieve Y does not mandate that a person must
do X, period."' (quoting Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2010))).
152. Id. at 1094 n.4 ("In Christensen, the Supreme Court allowed the DOL to enact further
regulation over compensatory time, because the DOL had been given the express authority to
do so. However, under § 203(m), the DOL has only been given authority to regulate the tips
of employers who take a tip credit. The DOL has not been given authority to regulate the tips
of employers who pay their employees a minimum wage and do not take a tip credit.
Therefore, unlike Christensen, there was no statutory silence permitting the DOL further
regulation of this issue." (citation omitted)).
153. Id. at 1094 ("In other words, the majority suggests an agency may regulate wherever
that statute does not forbid it to regulate.").
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silence warrants administrative interpretation, not the vast void of silence on
either side of it.'
154
According to the dissent, this is not how Chevron deference works.
Agencies are not "a legislative body unto [themselves], but instead must
carry out Congress's intent."' 155 Here, Cumbie declared Congress's intent
was clear; therefore, the agency cannot "go through the backdoor by
promulgating a new rule codifying its argument in Cumbie and its preferred
interpretation of section 203(m).' 156 Further, the dissenting opinion from the
denial of rehearing concluded that the majority "has stumbled off a
constitutional precipice."' 5 7 Judge O'Scannlain believed that the majority's
theory concerning the silence in § 203(m) was "entirely alien to our system
of laws"'' 58 and violated the well-known proposition that the Executive's
power must come from "an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself."'159  According to Judge O'Scannlain, the majority missed the
fundamental principle underlying this distinction, that "a statute's deliberate
non-interference with a class of activity is not a 'gap' in the statute at all; it
simply marks the point where Congress decided to stop authorization to
regulate."'' 60  The Perez III dissent argued that the majority's theory
effectively allowed the DOL to legislate by "interfer[ing] with conduct
[§ 203(m)] consciously left alone.' 16 1 For Judge O'Scannlain, however, the
Constitution does not allow agencies to exercise this power.
62
154. Id. (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014) ("Agencies
exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity ... .
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1094.
157. See Perez III, 843 F.3d 355, 358-59 (9th Cir. 2016) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 359-60 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343
U.S. 579 (1952)).
159. Id. at 360 n.2 (quoting Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 585). "Youngstown necessarily
rejects the idea that the Executive may interfere with a given interest simply because Congress
has not 'unambiguously and categorically protected' it." Id (quoting Steel Seizure, 343 U.S.
at 585).
160. Id. at 360.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 360 n.3. Judge O'Scannlain stated in a footnote:
As every novice learns, the official theory of the administrative state begins
from the premise that "the lawmaking function belongs to Congress... and may
not be conveyed to another branch or entity." Agency rulemaking respects that
constraint so long as it remains guided by an "intelligible principle" supplied by
Congress. But the panel majority would effectively vaporize even that flimsy
constraint by holding that an agency need not justify a given rule by tracing it to a
valid statutory grant of authority; instead, it need only demonstrate that Congress
has not affirmatively voiced opposition to the rule in question. The majority's
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E. The Perez II Decision Epitomizes the Problem of Deferring to
Jurisdictional Questions Concerning Statutory Silence
As the majority illustrates, the DOL found its authority to regulate those
who do not take a tip credit in § 203(m)'s silence concerning the practice,
and the Ninth Circuit upheld this interpretation under Chevron. 163 However,
as the dissenting opinions correctly pointed out, this silence cannot trigger
Chevron deference because Congress did not intend the DOL to regulate
those who do not take a tip credit. This Section demonstrates how Perez II
fits within the definition of jurisdiction-asserting cases arising out of
statutory silence and why a rule of no deference is preferable in this
circumstance.
Looking at the various types of jurisdictional questions, 164 this case
comports with the definition ofjurisdiction-asserting cases because the DOL
found its authority to extend § 203(m)'s restriction to all employers based on
the fact that the statute only mentions employers who take a tip credit. 165 For
the DOL and Ninth Circuit, the statute's silence regarding employers who
do not take a tip credit constituted a gap that the DOL was authorized to
fill. 16 6  Because the DOL utilized the absence of statutory language
addressing employers who do not take a tip credit, rather than an ambiguity
over which employers the statute mentions, Perez II exemplifies the type of
jurisdictional question this Comment criticizes-a jurisdiction-asserting
case arising out of statutory silence. 167
By allowing deference to the DOL's regulations, Perez II illustrates the
problem of deferring to this type ofjurisdictional question. In addition to the
reasoning of the district court in Perez and the dissents in Perez II and III,
the Ninth Circuit erred in three major aspects, warranting implementation of
a no-deference rule. First, the Perez II decision remains at odds with other
judicial treatment of the same statute. Second, this decision flouts firmly
established Supreme Court precedent on the powers agencies possess.
Lastly, Perez II ignores one of our Nation's most fundamental principles-
separation of powers. Because of these grave errors, the Supreme Court
should repudiate Perez II's theory of agency deference and implement a no-
vision makes a fear of "delegation running riot" look quaint by comparison, for it
would dispense with even the pretense of delegation altogether.
Id. (citations omitted).
163. SeePerez I, 816 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2016).
164. See supra Section I.B.
165. SeePerezlI, 816 F.3d at 1086-89.
166. Id.
167. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1502-03 (defining jurisdiction-asserting cases).
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deference rule for jurisdiction-asserting cases arising out of this type of
statutory silence.
With respect to interpreting § 203(m), the Perez II court stands out as
the only court to uphold the DOL's regulation.'68 Looking at the text of
§ 203(m), all courts that have addressed the issue have interpreted this
section to only apply to employers who take a tip credit, not all employers.
169
According to these courts, the text of § 203(m) is clear and unambiguous. 170
In addition, the Tenth Circuit recently held that the DOL lacked authority to
promulgate the DOL's 2011 rule. 171 Addressing the DOL's statutory silence
argument, the Tenth Circuit recognized that Chevron allows "agencies to
resolve an issue when 'the statute is silent' or leaves a 'gap." , 172 However,
the Tenth Circuit specified that the Supreme Court only speaks of gaps when
"considering undefined terms in a statute or a statutory directive to perform
a specific task without giving detailed instructions.' '17  In Marlow, the
statutory text contained no gap regarding any specific task; rather, the DOL
pointed to the "absence of any statutory directive to the contrary.' 174 The
Tenth Circuit denied that this silence created a gap and rebuked the DOL for
attempting to legislate. 175
168. See Marlow v. New Food Guy, Inc., 861 F.3d 1157, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017).
169. See id. at 1161; see also Trejo v. Ryman Hosp. Props., Inc., 795 F.3d 442, 448 (4th
Cir. 2015) ("[Section] 203(m) 'does not state freestanding requirements pertaining to all
tipped employees,' but rather creates rights and obligations for employers attempting to use
tips as a credit against the minimum wage."); Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc. 596 F.3d 577,
580-81 (9th Cir. 2010); Aguila v. Corp. Caterers II, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 1358, 1361 (S.D.
Fla. 2016); Malivuk v. Ameripark, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-2570-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97093, at *5-6 (N.D. Ga. July 26, 2016); Brueningsen v. Resort Express Inc., No. 2:12-cv-
00843-DN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9262, at * 10 (D. Utah Jan. 26, 2015); Mould v. NJG Food
Serv. Inc., No. JKB-13-1305, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84441, at *13-14 (D. Md. June 17,
2014); Czamik v. All Resort Coach, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-1097 TS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121766, at *14, *24-25 (D. Utah Aug. 26, 2013).
170. Marlow, 861 F.3dat 1162.
171. Id. at 1164 ("In sum, § 203(m)'s 'silence' about employers who decline the tip credit
is no 'gap' for an agency to fill. Instead, the text limits the tip restrictions in § 203(m) to those
employers who take the tip credit, leaving the DOL without authority to regulate to the
contrary.")
172. Id. at 1163 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1164.
175. Id. "Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of
such power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping
with Chevron and quite likely with the Constitution as well." Id. (quoting Ry. Labor Execs.'
Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
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In addition to creating circuit splits, Perez H breaks from nearly
century-old precedent regarding an agency's ability to determine the scope
of its powers. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Productions, Inc. 176 stands for the
proposition that "[t]he determination of the extent of authority given to a
delegated agency by Congress is not left for the decision of him in whom
authority is vested."'177 In Addison, the Supreme Court addressed regulations
promulgated by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) under the FLSA that
defined the "area of production" based in part on the number of employees
engaged in canning operations, rather than basing the definition solely on
geographical areas. 178 The Addison court reasoned that, although Congress
granted the WHD the authority to define the geographical area, the statutory
language was sufficiently detailed to "preclude their enlargement by
implication.' 179  Applying Addison to the present dispute, § 203(m)'s
language is sufficiently detailed, in that it only addressed employers taking
a tip credit, to preclude the DOL from expanding the scope to include all
employers.O
Lastly, and most importantly, Perez H raises serious separation of
powers concerns because the majority's decision effectively allowed the
DOL to legislate. As the Perez III dissent points out, an agency's power to
regulate must come from "an act of Congress."'' This is true because
"[a]gencies are creatures of Congress; 'an agency literally has no power to
act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon it.""' 182 Just as the
"Constitution permits the national government to exercise only those powers
affirmatively granted to it by the people of the several states," an agency
cannot act without Congress conferring authority on it."'
Here, the DOL reversed the longstanding rule that any tip-pooling
arrangements are valid as long as the employer does not take a tip credit and
purported to have authority to regulate a class of employers not addressed in
176. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
177. Id. at 616.
178. Id. at 608-11.
179. Id. at 618. "Congress did not leave it to the [WHD] to decide whether within
geographic bounds defined by [the WHD] the Act further permits discrimination between
establishment and establishment based upon the number of employees." Id. at 616.
180. See Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 35 (1987) ("[W]here the FLSA
provides exemptions 'in detail and with particularity,' we have found this to preclude
'enlargement by implication."' (quoting Addison, 322 U.S. at 617)).
181. Perez III, 843 F.3d 355, 360 n.2-3 (9th Cir. 2016) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting)
(quoting Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)).
182. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)).
183. Am. Bus Ass'nv. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sentelle, J., concurring).
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the statute.'84 By upholding the DOL's interpretation, the Ninth Circuit
effectively allowed the DOL to legislate, yet this is something agencies
cannot do because they lack any inherent powers.'85
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REJECT PEREZ II TYPES OF
"STATUTORY SILENCE" DEFERENCE AND IMPLEMENT THIS COMMENT'S
PROPOSED NO-DEFERENCE RULE
The Perez II decision reverses Chevron's presumption of congressional
intent and represents a grave error by grounding its decision in § 203(m)'s
silence. This Part argues that if the Supreme Court has the opportunity to
hear another case like Perez II, it should grant certiorari and establish a no-
deference rule for agency interpretations on jurisdictional questions
grounded in statutory silence. In support of this new rule, Part III offers two
principal justifications for why agency interpretations do not warrant
deference in this context. First, this rule ensures that congressional intent
remains the benchmark for Chevron analysis. Second, this rule prevents
agency aggrandizement by requiring courts, not agencies, to determine
whether a statute grants an agency interpretive authority. Lastly, this Part
addresses Justice Scalia's critiques of a no-deference rule for jurisdictional
questions.
A. Proposed No-Deference Rule and Justifications
When courts review an agency's interpretation of its jurisdiction arising
from statutory silence, Chevron dictates that the agency's interpretation
receives deference, so long as the agency stays within its statutory
authority. 8 6 This Comment argues that an exception to this rule deserves
merit; specifically, the Supreme Court should hold that Chevron deference
is not applicable to jurisdictional questions in which the underlying assertion
of power comes from this Perez H type of statutory silence. In these
situations, the reviewing court should review the statute de novo in order to
ascertain whether the agency possessed the statutory authority required.
This rule finds support in Chevron's background presumption of
congressional intent.18 7 Because the agency's asserted authority rests on a
184. See supra Section II.B.
185. See Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 670 (D.C. Cir
1994) (en banc) ("[A]n agency's power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress."
(quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986))).
186. City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
187. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); see also supra
Section I.A.
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statute's silence, in the sense that it does not expressly deny or grant the
power, a reviewing court should not defer to the agency interpretation. Such
deference contradicts Chevron's teachings because the fact that the statute
does not explicitly address the proposed power means Congress could not
have had an intention to delegate that decision to the agency.'88 As Judge
O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit pointed out, a statute's silence does not
always mean Congress delegated legislative authority to the agency to
expand its scope; rather, the silence is best interpreted as a limit on an
agency's regulatory authority. 8 9 This Comment's proposed rule guarantees
that the judiciary decides whether the silence is just "the point where
Congress decided to stop authorization to regulate."' 9
As the Perez H decision illustrates, deference to agency interpretations
on matters of jurisdiction arising from statutory silence not only allows but
also promotes agency aggrandizement.' 9' If the Ninth Circuit's decision
stands, the DOL will possess authority to regulate a class of employers' tip-
pooling practices that Congress never intended to regulate.' 92 As Cumbie
established, Congress intended to only regulate those who do take a tip
credit. '9' For employers who do not take tip credits, Congress left them free
to do as they wish. 19 4 The Perez H court effectively allowed the DOL a
backdoor into powers the statute did not grant. For this reason alone, the
Supreme Court should adopt this no-deference rule because the threat of
aggrandizement is too high, something the Supreme Court has recognized
before. 9'
188. In essence, deference in this scenario flouts the established maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius "the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others." See
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
107 (2012). As is the case with the language of § 203, Justice Scalia acknowledges that "[t]he
more specific the enumeration, the greater the force of the canon." Id. at 108. "[I]f Parliament
in legislating speaks only of specific things and specific situations, it is a legitimate inference
that the particulars exhaust the legislative will. The particular which is omitted from the
particulars mentioned is the casus omissus, which the judge cannot supply because that would
amount to legislation." Id. at 108 (quoting J. A. Corry, Administrative Law and the
Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 286, 298 (1936)).
189. Perez III, 843 F.3d 355, 360 (9th Cir. 2016) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223 (2009)).
190. Id.
191. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1503.
192. See supra Section IID.
193. See Cumbie v. Woody Woo, Inc., 596 F.3d 577, 581-82 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[The]
FLSA does not restrict tip pooling when no tip credit is taken.").
194. Id.
195. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944)
("[D]etermination of the extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not
left for the decision of him in whom authority is vested.").
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B. Justice Scalia's Criticism
Arguably the fiercest critic of a no-deference rule, Justice Scalia
consistently maintained that Chevron deference is applicable to
jurisdictional questions. This Section provides an overview of this criticism
and illustrates how this Comment's no-deference rule provides a solution to
this problem without raising any of the concerns Justice Scalia pointed out.
Although Justice Scalia purported to settle the issue of whether an
agency receives deference on interpretations concerning its jurisdiction in
City of Arlington,196 the debate on the Supreme Court over this issue traces
back to Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore,197 where
Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia grappled with this issue at length. 198
Justice Scalia took aim at no-deference proposals for two reasons. First, he
contended that courts lacked the ability to distinguish between jurisdictional
and nonjurisdictional questions. 199 Second, deference on these questions
allows courts to substitute their own policy considerations for that of the
agency by manipulating the level of generality at which jurisdiction is
defined.20 0 Justice Scalia further reiterated this fear of judicial activism in
City of Arlington by contending that "[s]avvy challengers of agency action
would play the 'jurisdictional' card" in order to transfer interpretative
authority from the agencies to the courts. 20 ' According to Justice Scalia,
agencies must decide jurisdictional issues because "'judges ought to refrain
from substituting their own interstitial lawmaking' for that of an agency.,
20 2
Although Justice Scalia raised several valid points, this Comment's no-
deference rule preserves the overall purpose of Chevron without implicating
any of Justice Scalia's concerns. First of all, jurisdictional questions arising
196. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013); see also Section I.B.
197. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
198. Compare id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending "it is settled law that the rule
of [Chevron] deference applies even to an agency's interpretation of its own statutory
authority or jurisdiction") with id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending "[a]gencies
do not 'administer' statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and such statutes are not
,entrusted' to agencies").
199. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing "there is no discernible line between an
agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application of its
authority").
200. Id. ("Virtually any administrative action can be characterized as either the one or the
other, depending upon how generally one wishes to describe the 'authority."' (citing NLRB
v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 n.7 (1984))).
201. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873. "The effect [of this no-deference exception]
would be to transfer any number of interpretive decisions-archetypal Chevron questions,
about how best to construe an ambiguous term in light of competing policy interests-from
the agencies that administer the statutes to federal courts." Id.
202. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)).
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out of statutory silence do not present much difficulty for courts to
identify. 20 3 This is because the underlying assertion of power comes from a
statute's failure to expressly mention the act in question; therefore, a court
could easily discern, through the normal tools of statutory construction,
whether or not a statute was silent.
To illustrate this point, consider Justice Scalia's Common Carrier Act
hypothetical from City of Arlington.2 °4 He provided two alternative
formulations of a statute to "illustrate just how illusory the proposed line
between 'jurisdictional' and 'nonjurisdictional' agency interpretations is.",205
His first formulation was: "SECTION 1. The Agency shall have jurisdiction
to prohibit any common carrier from imposing an unreasonable condition
upon access to its facilities., 20 6 His second formulation stated: "SECTION 1.
No common carrier shall impose an unreasonable condition upon access to
its facilities. SECTION 2. The Agency may prescribe rules and regulations
necessary in the public interest to effectuate Section 1 of this Act., 20
7
Further, Justice Scalia presumed that the Agency promulgated a rule that
included Internet Service Providers within the term "common carrier" in
Section 1 of both acts.208
According to Justice Scalia, this example shows that the jurisdictional
label is illusory because the issue can be restated as whether the agency
"exceed[ed] the scope of its authority (its 'jurisdiction') [or] exceed[ed]
authorized application of authority that it unquestionably has., 20 9 For Justice
Scalia, the label of jurisdiction is irrelevant because the question is always
"whether the statutory text forecloses the agency's assertion of authority, or
not., 210 Whereas, Chief Justice Roberts opined that this example illustrates
that courts must determine whether "Congress has delegated authority to the
agency to issue those interpretations with the force of law." 21 ' Although the
two disagree about whether deference is warranted, both justices have no
203. See Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 665 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc) (explaining that the Railway Labor Act grants the NMB authority to
investigate representation disputes "upon the request of either party to the dispute," but the
Act is silent about whether the NMB could investigate sua sponte). The court easily identified
that the agency's assertion of authority came from a statute's silence and emphatically rejected
that deference was required. Id. at 671.
204. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1869-70.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1869.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1870.
210. Id. at 1871.
211. Id. at 1885 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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difficulty agreeing that whether Internet Service Providers fall within the
purview of the statute can be characterized as a jurisdictional question. 212
Specifically, this common carrier hypothetical falls within the first
category ofjurisdictional cases identified by Sales and Adler-ajurisdiction-
asserting case.213 Under either version of the statute, the Agency relies on
the ambiguous term "common carrier" as evidence that Congress intended
the Agency to define this term, thereby expanding its scope within the
statute. Concededly, this is exactly the type of agency interpretation that
warrants Chevron deference because the statute is ambiguous and Congress
included no limiting language.1 4 In addition, this Comment agrees that
deference is warranted because this example does not present the same
jurisdictional question as Perez II-one in which the assertion ofjurisdiction
arises out of a statutory silence.21 5
To illustrate this point, consider the following amended version of the
Common Carrier Act: "The Agency shall have jurisdiction to prohibit any
common carrier [that is publicly owned] from imposing an unreasonable
condition upon access to its facilities., 21 6 In this version of the statute, the
Act only addresses common carriers that are publicly owned, failing to
mention whether this restriction applies to all (or privately owned) common
carriers. If the Agency promulgated regulations that applied this Act's
prohibition to all common carriers, including privately owned common
carriers, the Agency's action would fall within the subcategory of
jurisdiction-asserting cases arising out of a statutory silence. 2' 7 In this
narrow case, this Comment's proposed no-deference rule would require the
court to consider whether any statutory language permits the Agency's
interpretation, rather than affording Chevron deference.
Further, this example illustrates how courts can easily identify
jurisdictional questions arising out of statutory silence. Where the first
example deals with an ambiguity within the statute, normal Chevron
deference applies; however, where the statute is silent on the proposed
power, not merely ambiguous, the assertion of jurisdiction does not warrant
deference. Because the assertion of power comes from the lack of any
statutory ambiguity, a reviewing court need look no further than the text of
the statute to determine whether this Comment's no-deference rule would
apply. This Comment's rule would require courts to determine whether the
212. See id.; see also id. at 1869-70 (majority opinion).
213. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1503.
214. See supra Section I.A.
215. See Perez I, 816 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016).
216. City of-Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1869.
217. See Sales & Adler, supra note 13, at 1506; see also supra Section I.C.
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statute allows the agency action in this limited scenario, rather than deferring
to the agency's interpretation.
Additionally, a no-deference approach in this narrow circumstance does
not present the judicial aggrandizement that Justice Scalia warned against for
several reasons. First, this type of jurisdictional assertion based on silence
cannot be manipulated by the level of generality at which jurisdiction is
defined because this type of jurisdictional claim relies on a statute being
silent in the sense that Congress did not authorize an agency to act.
Returning to our revised Common Carrier hypothetical, the statute only
addresses common carriers that are publicly owned, yet the Agency used this
statute's silence (on whether this restriction applies to privately owned
carriers) as the basis for applying the Act's restriction to all carriers. This
type of assertion ofjurisdiction only exists in this narrow factual setting, and
reviewing courts could not manipulate the first hypothetical to fit within this
type of jurisdictional question.
By basing this rule on the lack of statutory text, there is no level of
generality to manipulate because the statute never authorized the agency
authority in the first place. In addition, the risk of judicial activism is low
because this proposed rule only asks a reviewing court to use "traditional
tools of statutory construction" to determine if the statute is in fact silent, per
Chevron's instructions.218 Therefore, this rule comports with Chevron's
overall theme of congressional intent because this exception tasks the courts
with determining if "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue., 21 9 Further, as Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in his dissent in City
ofArlington, the Constitution tasks the Judiciary with ensuring that the other
branches of the government stay within their respective spheres.2 20 In the
Chevron context, this duty "means ensuring that the Legislative Branch has
in fact delegated lawmaking power to an agency within the Executive
Branch.",22' By not deferring to an agency's interpretation of authority
arising out of statutory silence, the Judiciary faithfully performs its intended
function of guaranteeing all branches of government stay within their
respective roles. Overall, a no-deference rule for jurisdictional questions
arising out of statutory silence finds support in Chevron and its progeny and
does not raise the concerns associated with a no-deference rule for all
jurisdictional questions.
218. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had
an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect.").
219. See id. at 842.
220. City of-Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
221. Id.
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CONCLUSION
If given another chance to hear a Perez II type case, the Supreme Court
should clarify its Chevron jurisprudence by establishing a no-deference rule
for statutory silence cases. Just as the statute forbidding dogs in a park
cannot serve as authority for a Parks Department to ban other animals not
listed, § 203(m) of the FLSA cannot be read to serve as authority for the
DOL to regulate a class of employers not addressed in the text of the statute:
those who do not take a tip credit. As the dissenting opinion in Perez II
illustrated, this decision ignored FLSA precedent, contradicted basic
teachings of administrative law, and "tum[ed] Chevron on its head." '222
Unfortunately, this decision presents an even more fundamental error
because deference on this type of statutory silence case effectively allows an
agency to legislate, yet only Congress possesses this power.
223
The Supreme Court should adopt this Comment's proposed bright-line
rule for statutory silence cases: Chevron deference is not applicable to
jurisdictional questions in which the underlying assertion of power comes
from a Perez II type of statutory silence. As this Comment illustrates, this
rule is necessary for two reasons. First, this rule ensures that congressional
intent is the benchmark for Chevron analysis by guaranteeing that an agency
locate a statutory grant of authority before deference is accorded. The fact
that a statute is silent, in the sense that it neither grants nor denies a specific
power, shows a congressional intent not to speak about that power. Second,
this rule prevents the biggest problem facing this type of jurisdictional
questions: agency aggrandizement. As the Perez II decision illustrates,
deference on this type ofjurisdictional question results in agencies asserting
power ex nihilo to regulate groups which congress never intended to regulate.
Spencer S. Fritts*
222. Perez I, 816 F.3d 1080, 1094 (2016) (Smith, J., dissenting).
223. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States ....").
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